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Abstract. This paper estimates treatment effects of two active labor market policies – a 
training program and a wage subsidy scheme – on participants' employment probabilities. 
The analysis is based on unique data from the 18th wave of the Polish Labor Force Survey 
containing detailed and extensive individual labor force status histories. We discuss two 
variants of an exact covariate matching procedure adapted to the specific nature of the 
data. Our study confirms and reinforces a point raised in recent research (Heckman and 
Smith 1999, 2004), that pre-treatment labor force status dynamics play a decisive role in 
determining program participation. We implement a conditional difference-in-differences 
estimator of treatment effects based on these individual trinomial sequences of pre-
treatment labor market status. The estimator employs a “moving window” technique that 
nicely controls for changes in the macroeconomic environment over time. Our findings 
suggest that training raises individual employment probability, while wage subsidies display 
negative treatment effects for participants in the Polish case. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the last decade there has been much interest by labor economists in the evaluation of 
so-called Active Labor Market Policy (ALMP), i.e. policy measures such as training 
programs, wage subsidy schemes, or direct job provision in the public sector. These 
measures, generally, aim at increasing the employment probability and/or the earnings 
performance of program participants. In the US, experiences with both the implementation 
and evaluation of such programs date back well into the 1960s (Heckman, LaLonde and 
Smith 1999). In Europe, where unemployment had remained comparatively low until the 
1980s, or even until the 1990s in some countries, running such programs and evaluating 
them is a rather recent phenomenon. Nevertheless, most countries in Western Europe 
have now utilized active labor market measures for many years, and have done so with 
substantial financial input in terms of fraction of GDP spent on these measures (see e.g. 
OECD 2000, 2004). Also the evaluation practice, while still lagging behind the US 
“evaluation culture” to some extent, has attained increasing interest – and funding – by 
European policy makers, both in individual countries and from the European 
Commission.1  
 Looking further east we observe that – after the breakdown of the socialist regimes 
and the beginning of the “transition process” around 1990 – Eastern European countries 
were confronted with the task of redesigning their welfare system. Suddenly facing 
substantial open unemployment, schemes for passive and active support of unemployed 
individuals had to be set up from scratch. Frequently this led to transition countries’ 
adoption of Western schemes, often without much knowledge about their efficiency. 
Poland, too, implemented a system of unemployment benefit support, accompanied by a 
set of Active Labor Market Policies. Specifically, two significant active programs for the 
unemployed implemented in Poland are (i) a training program, and (ii) “Intervention 
Works”, a wage subsidy scheme.  
While the importance of such programs – as expressed in government spending in 
terms of GDP share – has declined in Poland over recent years, a few studies of Polish 
labor market dynamics and Active Labor Market Policy evaluation were undertaken in the 
late 1990s (Góra and Schmidt 1998, Puhani 1998). In this paper, we will build on earlier 
work on program evaluation in Poland (Kluve, Lehmann and Schmidt 1999) and provide 
                                                          
1 Kluve and Schmidt (2002) and Kluve (2006) give accounts of the European experience with Active Labor 
Market Policies and contrast this experience with the evidence from the US. 
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an in-depth investigation of the Polish experience with Active Labor Market Policy in the 
mid-1990s, specifically the years 1992 to 1996. 
 There is a set of features that make this study particularly interesting. First, we use 
data from the 18th wave of the Polish Labor Force Survey (PLFS). The data were collected 
in August 1996, and contained a supplementary questionnaire on past labor market 
experience of respondents. This supplement generated a unique set of individual labor 
market histories dating from January 1992 until August 1996, and comprising a person's 
labor force status for every single month. The monthly labor force status captures 
employment, unemployment, inactivity, and participation in an active labor market 
program, as well as a set of other states, such as caring for a child etc., that are of minor 
interest to our study. 
 Second, the evaluation is set against the background of a country in the early years 
of transition. This implies a rapidly changing macroeconomic environment, making it 
indispensable to develop a treatment effect estimator that can account for these changes in 
an appropriate manner. Third, in addition to estimating treatment effects on the basis of 
individual labor force status histories, we can use the detailed monthly data to investigate 
further how important such labor market histories are in fact for determining participation 
in the program, and hence the evaluation approach. Recent research (Heckman and Smith 
2004, complementing Heckman and Smith 1999) suggests that labor force status dynamics 
play the central role in driving participation dynamics. We will reinforce this point made by 
Heckman and Smith on the basis of a different data set, different active labor market 
programs implemented in a different country, in an entirely different context. 
 The core part of our analysis is the development of a matching estimator based on 
individual pre-treatment labor force status sequences. This creates a “moving window” 
structure that allows for individually flexible entry into and exit out of the program, hence 
conditioning on covariates and labor force status sequences at exactly the month of 
program start, and comparing outcomes at exactly the month of program termination. 
Clearly, this procedure not only increases comparability of treated and comparison units, 
but also nicely controls for changes in the macroeconomic environment. Our approach is 
delineated using two matched samples, for two active policy measures – (i) Training and (ii) 
Intervention Works, respectively, created from the reservoir of program participants and a 
comparison group consisting of those untreated individuals that were unemployed at least 
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once over the sample period.2 For a sample (A) the comparison group is matched on a set 
of covariates, in particular taking into account the local labor market context, a variable 
whose importance in program evaluation is e.g. pointed out in Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd (1997). In addition, for a sample (B) matches are formed on both covariates and 
four-quarter individual pre-treatment labor market histories, in the spirit of Card and 
Sullivan (1988). 
 The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the institutional set-up and 
expenditure patterns of ALMP in Poland during our sampling period (1992-1996). The 
third section delineates our data and the matching approach to program evaluation. In 
section 4 we discuss the matched samples, focusing on the timing of interventions and the 
role of pre-treatment labor force status histories. Section 5 presents our estimation strategy 
and estimation results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Active Labor Market Policies in Poland 
Expenditures on labor market policies by the Polish government disbursed by the Labor 
Fund3 have been rather limited in international perspective. As Table 1 demonstrates, in 
the years 1990 to 1996 Poland spent roughly 2 percent of GDP on passive and active labor 
market policies, compared to about 3 percent of GDP spent by most OECD countries, 
many of which had far lower unemployment rates than Poland. As we can also see from 
Table 1, apart from 1990 when registered unemployment was relatively low, expenditures 
on ALMP are only a small fraction of total expenditures on the unemployed, never 
exceeding one eighth of total expenditures. Kubiak (2005) makes convincingly the point 
that throughout the 1990s outlays on ALMP in real terms are “crowded out” by the 
payment of unemployment benefits: as the number of unemployed rises, these outlays fall 
and vice versa.  
In addition to training and intervention works, the two measures evaluated in this 
paper, labor offices also funded the following schemes: public works, loans for 
entrepreneurial activity, and a measure to integrate unemployed school leavers into the 
labor market. Table 2 shows, however, that training and intervention works consumed 
more than fifty percent of all expenditures on ALMP measures in the years 1991 to 1996. 
                                                          
2 Eligibility of program participation was confined to people registered with the local labor office as 
unemployed. 
3 The Labor Fund is a special fund that is financed by a 3 percent payroll tax to be paid by employers and by 
donations from the central budget (Golinowska 1999). All expenditures in connection with training and 
intervention works are paid from this fund.     
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Between 1992 and 1996 the two measures have relatively large stocks of participants (cf. 
Table 3), while the number of placements of unemployed in public works slots is small in 
the first two years and only thereafter growing. The measure to integrate unemployed 
school leavers becomes an important element of Polish ALMP only after 1996.4 So, during 
the period for which we have individual labor market history data (cf. subsequent sections) 
only training and intervention works were measures with large enough stocks of 
participants that allow a rigorous microeconometric analysis of their efficacy.     
 
2.1 Institutional issues and unemployment benefit regulations for the general pool 
of unemployed  
Even before the beginning of economic reform in January 1990 the Polish government 
established a legal framework that defined the scope and nature of passive and active labor 
market policies (ALMP). The Law on Employment passed in December 19895 had several 
modifications and extensions over the years. For the discussion of the two ALMP 
measures during the reported period in our paper (1992 to 1996) two new laws modifying 
and extending the original law are relevant, namely the Law on Employment and 
Unemployment from 19916 and the Law on Employment and Measures to Combat 
Unemployment from 1994.7 The great bulk of the regulations of the 1994 law are still valid 
today, i.e. there has been substantial inertia in labor market legislation. Before discussing 
the two ALMP measures in detail, we will briefly describe the unemployment benefit 
regulations and their evolution over the relevant period for those unemployed who did not 
participate in a program. 
 The provisions for unemployment benefits for the general pool of unemployed 
went through several stages of major revisions. The original law of 1989 foresaw open-
ended as well as earnings-related benefits and did not impose any previous employment 
requirement. Unemployed persons who registered with the local employment office were 
                                                          
4 In 1990 loans for entrepreneurial activity were the predominant ALMP measure, probably because this 
measure required little administrative infrastructure that still needed to be built at that time. Since 1991 these 
loans have been marginal, while the measure to integrate unemployed school leavers did not exist in the first 
years but became as important as intervention works and public works towards the end of the nineties. For a 
discussion of these trends, see Kubiak (2005). 
5 The law was published under the Polish name “Ustawa o Zatrudnieniu” in the Polish Government’s official 
bulletin “Dziennik Ustaw” in December 1989 (number 75, position 446). 
6 The “Ustawa o Zatrudnienie i Bezrobociu” was published in the Dziennik Ustaw in October 1991 (number 
106, position 457).  
7 The “Ustawa o Zatrudnieniu i Przeciwdzialaniu Bezrobocia” was published in the Dziennik Ustaw in 
January 1995 (number 1, position 1).  
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entitled to such benefits seven days after registration. They received 70 percent of the net 
wage at their last employment for the first three months of unemployment, 50 percent for 
the next six months and 40 percent when their spell was longer than nine months. Persons 
who had never worked received the minimum wage. Local labor offices applied ILO 
criteria when determining whether a registered person was unemployed.  
The amendments incorporated in the 1991 law foresaw a previous employment 
requirement: persons had to have worked over the last year before registration for at least 
180 days to be entitled to benefits. While the earnings-related nature of benefits was still 
kept with this new law, benefit payments were now limited in general to 12 months. There 
were, however, some important exceptions to this last rule. Workers with at least 25 years 
of experience if female and 30 years if male were entitled to 18 months of benefits if they 
became unemployed. Unemployed who were within two years of retirement and who had 
the above mentioned long work experience could receive benefits until they retired. Since 
under central planning all able bodied employed persons had continuous employment 
relationships over their working life, using age and gender as matching criteria ensures 
virtually in all cases that unemployment benefit rules are identical for treated persons and 
their controls.  
The last law relevant for our paper, which took effect on the 1st of January 1995, 
introduced two major changes. It introduced a flat rate of benefits, amounting to 36 
percent of the average wage in the economy and it allowed for a variation of the length of 
benefits by region. The latter regulation foresaw that in voivodships (regions) in which the 
unemployment rate was 50 percent below (above) the national average the entitlement could 
be decreased (increased) to 6 (18) months. While, subsequently, this provision was rarely 
used, by matching on voivodship we are not only trying to control for local labor market 
conditions but also ensuring that in the few cases when this provision might apply both 
treated and controls have the same potential length of benefits.   
 
2.2 Intervention works (prace interwencyjne) 
Intervention works is essentially a measure of subsidized employment. In the reported 
period, firms could create subsidized jobs if they had not laid off in the previous year more 
than 10 percent of their workforce or if they were not in the state of liquidation or 
bankruptcy. Also, intervention works jobs could only be created if they did not crowd out 
regular non-subsidized jobs in a sector. Until 1994 the maximum duration of these 
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subsidized jobs could be six months; after the law was amended in December 1994 the 
maximum duration was stipulated to be twelve months. Local labor offices used resources 
from the Labor Fund to reimburse a part of the costs of a subsidized job for a period of six 
months (until 1994) or up to twelve months (after 1994). Before the law was amended the 
Labor Fund paid wage costs amounting to unemployment benefits and social security 
contributions if the participant was entitled to benefits. If the person had no benefit 
entitlements, wage costs as large as the minimum unemployment benefits were reimbursed 
as well as the paid social security contributions. After 1994, the reimbursement policy was 
slightly more complicated, as the costs of jobs lasting up to six months were reimbursed as 
before, while with jobs lasting between six and twelve months the Labor Fund paid all 
wage costs every second month, as long as these costs did not exceed the minimum 
earnings at these jobs in the firm and the corresponding social security contributions. If a 
worker was retained on the job for an indefinite period after the end of the subsidized 
spell, the firm received a premium of one monthly national average remuneration (until 
1994) or of 150 percent of one monthly national average remuneration (after 1994). 
The unemployed participating in an intervention works job received the going wage 
and fringe benefits for the assumed position at the specific firm. An unemployed person 
who did not find regular employment after the end of the subsidized job was entitled to 
twelve months of unemployment benefits. Before the law was amended at the end of 1994 
this entitlement was extended to all unemployed on an intervention works job, even if this 
job had lasted less than 180 days. With the amendment of the law, this stipulation was 
removed and unemployed were only entitled to benefits after a subsidized job spell if this 
spell had lasted at least 180 days, reflecting the general rule that benefits entitlement was 
only given to those who in the previous year had worked at least 180 days. When entitled 
to a new round of benefits, a person was subject to the same rules and regulations as a 
person from the general pool of unemployed. 
The unemployed did not select themselves into the intervention works jobs but 
were selected by officials of local employment offices. In the years 1992 to 1996, two 
decrees by the ministry of labor and social policy gave some guidance on whom to select 
into the program.8 The decree at the end of 1991 foresaw that an employment office had to 
take the age and the health status into consideration when choosing participants, as well as 
                                                          
8 The decrees of 17th December 1991 and of 21st of March 1995 on the question of the organization of 
intervention works and public works.  
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the benefits accruing to society. Apart from these rather vague stipulations, employment 
offices were directed to choose unemployed school leavers, persons with unemployment 
spells of more than six months, unemployed with the appropriate skills and persons with 
prospects of continuing employment after the termination of the subsidized job spell. The 
second decree, passed in March of 1995, foresaw the selection of persons with 
unemployment spells of more than twelve months, of persons whose spouse was also 
unemployed and of unemployed single parents. The two stipulations about the selection of 
unemployed with the appropriate skills and persons with prospects of continuing 
employment after the termination of the subsidized job spell appeared in both decrees, as 
well as the vague notion that participation in the intervention works scheme had to be 
beneficial to society.      
 
2.3 Training (Szkolenie zawodowe) 
In the reported period, the training scheme involved retraining and further training with 
the stated aim of attenuating skill mismatch. It was initiated and financed by local 
employment offices from resources made available by the Labor Fund. Unemployed 
workers but also workers who were still employed but faced redundancy could participate 
in training measures. The training for the unemployed took place predominantly in private 
training institutions while employed trainees did undergo retraining or further training at 
the firm that had approached the local employment office for financial support of these 
training measures. According to the law, the training should not exceed six months, 
however, under exceptional circumstances a training period of up to twelve months was 
considered admissible. Local employment offices financed up to fifty percent of the 
training costs of still employed workers who faced redundancy.  
In the years 1992 to 1996, there were three types of participants in the training 
program. First, unemployed who were selected by local employment offices for training. 
Second, unemployed who themselves chose a retraining or further training scheme, with 
the local employment office being prompted by law to finance this training if there was a 
high probability that after the training the unemployed could enter a regular job. The third 
category were still employed workers who faced redundancy for reasons that had to do 
with the economic situation of the firm. The law passed at the end of 1994 foresaw a 
fourth type of participants. Firms with more than fifty employees could apply for training 
subsidies in order to retrain workers who were threatened by redundancy at their existing 
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jobs and who had prospects of being employing in different positions at the same firm for 
a period of at least twelve months after the end of the training. These training subsidies 
amounted to up to fifty percent of the training costs.        
The law passed in October 1991 established detailed rules about the remuneration 
of unemployed training participants while on a training course. We report here the rules for 
those types of unemployed who made up the bulk of training participants. Those 
unemployed who lost the ability to perform their job because of a work accident or 
because of professional illness received 100 percent of their earnings in their last job, but at 
least 40 percent and not more than 110 percent of average earnings in the economy. For 
unemployed made redundant this remuneration while training amounted to 80 percent of 
earnings in the last job, with the above mentioned lower and upper bounds related to 
average national earnings. Unemployed school leavers participating in training received 115 
percent of the unemployment benefits to which they were entitled, while those 
unemployed training participants who had never worked before did not receive any income 
support.   
The law of 1991 was very generous for trainees as far as benefit entitlements were 
concerned. An unemployed person undergoing training was entitled to twelve months of 
benefits if the local employment office was not able to mediate a regular job after the 
unemployed had finished the training or was not putting the trainee on an intervention 
works or public works scheme. The law of 1994, taking effect on January 1st 1995,  
eliminated this generosity. The trainee could receive only one month of benefit payment 
after the end of the training and only in the case that s/he was entitled to benefits during 
the last month before taking up the training. 
 
3. Data and Methods 
3.1 The Data 
We employ data from the 18th wave of the Polish Labour Force Survey (PLFS) as of 
August 1996. The PLFS is a quarterly rotating panel introduced in May 1992. The distinct 
feature of the August 1996 wave is a supplementary questionnaire containing retrospective 
questions on individual labor market behavior. Specifically, the questionnaire allows 
constructing individual labor market histories on the basis of labor force status in every 
single month. Possible states are employed, unemployed, inactive, program participation, 
etc. (see below). The individual histories cover the 56-month-period from January 1992 to 
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August 1996.  
Our evaluation of the Training and Intervention Works programs is based on 
considering (a) pre-treatment labor force status information over a period of 4 quarters, i.e. 
12 months, and (b) post-treatment employment outcomes over a period of 3 quarters, i.e. 9 
months. Given an overall sampling period from January 1992 until August 1996, we 
therefore focus on individuals whose treatment started after December 1992 and ended 
before December 1995. The analysis takes into account all individuals who experienced at 
least one spell of unemployment during the observation period. For both treated units and 
potential comparison units this ensures consideration of individuals potentially eligible for 
participation in ALMP measures offered by the labor offices. We discuss sample 
composition in more detail in section 4.1. 
 In order to be able to handle such rich data, we had to condense the information 
contained in the individual labor market histories. Monthly entries comprise, for instance, 
states such as “employed”, “unemployed”, “receiving unemployment benefits”, “maternal 
leave”, etc. Furthermore, individual histories indicate whether and when an individual took 
part in an ALMP course. We compress the 30 possible monthly states occurring in the data 
into the three labor market states “employed” (henceforth denoted “1”), “unemployed” 
(denoted “2”), and “out-of-the-labor-force” (denoted “0”). Information on treatment 
participation is stored separately. Kluve et al. (1999) give a more detailed account of data 
transformation and adaptation. The resulting structure of individual spells for treatment 
and potential comparisons will be illustrated further in section 4.2. 
 In the estimation of individual treatment effects we consider two distinct measures 
of Polish ALMP, (i) Training and (ii) Intervention Works. (i) Training is meant to enhance, 
or at least sustain, individual human capital. The Polish Training measure predominantly 
entails training off-the-job9 whose final aim is raising a non-employed person’s probability 
of re-employment in a regular job. A minor component of this measure consists in 
preparing persons still employed in jobs threatened by redundancy for viable jobs in the 
same firm or elsewhere. Hence, the overriding aim is to attenuate skill mismatch. (ii) Wage 
subsidy schemes like the Polish Intervention Works also have a human capital enhancing 
or -preserving aspect. The enhancement or preservation of a person’s human capital takes 
                                                          
9 Since off-the-job training entails training of persons who are either unemployed or out-of-the-labor-force 
when training started, we can use the pre-treatment labor force status sequences to estimate the fraction of 
training participants engaged in this type of training. Before the law was amended in December 1994, 73 
percent of participants engaged in off-the-job training, while after December 1994 this fraction amounted to 
69 percent. 
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place on-the-job. This human capital component of the program is thought to increase the 
chances of a participant to find regular, non-subsidized employment at the same firm or 
elsewhere after the end of the program. In addition, if there is asymmetric information 
about the productivity of potential employees, wage subsidy schemes are designed to 
facilitate temporary job matches that might translate into regular and lasting matches at the 
same firm once the subsidy ends. 
A crucial feature of ALMP regulation in the reported period, however, was that 
participation in Intervention Works was considered by the law like any other employment 
spell, hence in essence entitling individuals to a new round of benefit receipt. Taking part in 
a Polish training measure, on the other hand, did not entitle the large majority of 
participants to unemployment benefits.10  
 
3.2 Matching Methods 
Program evaluation aims at estimating causal effects of treatments, i.e. changes in the 
outcome variable of interest that are due to participation in the treatment. The application 
of matching methods for treatment effect estimation has become quite popular over recent 
years, and several variants of matching estimators are now routinely applied.11 The causal 
model underlying this approach has become known as the “Potential Outcome Model” and 
is based on work by Neyman (1923 [1990]), Fisher (1935) and Rubin (1974, 1977; see also 
Holland 1986 for discussion). The model formalizes the idea that, in order to infer a causal 
effect of the treatment on the outcome variable, it is necessary to identify the 
counterfactual, i.e. what would have happened to the treatment group if it had not been 
exposed to treatment? Then the causal effect of treatment is given by the difference 
between the factual (=exposed to treatment) and counterfactual (=not exposed to 
treatment) outcomes for the participant population. 
 Let the binary variable {0,1}iD ∈  indicate the treatment received, i.e. 1iD =  if the 
                                                          
10 As discussed in section 2, before the law was changed in December 1994 participants had their benefit 
entitlement renewed no matter what the duration of the intervention work job, while starting with January 
1995 the subsidized job had to have lasted at least 180 days, i.e. six months. Since roughly three quarters of 
intervention works participants in our sample started the scheme before December 1994 and since the 
duration of two thirds of those intervention works jobs started in January 1995 or later amounted to at least 
six months, the vast majority of participants was clearly entitled to a new round of benefits. Roughly two 
thirds of participants in training started the measure after December 1994, when it had become virtually 
impossible for trainees to receive unemployment benefits. 
11 Much research has been conducted in labor economics and econometrics on the practical and theoretical 
properties of matching estimators. See, for instance, the debate between Dehejia/Wahba and Smith/Todd 
(Dehejia and Wahba 1999, 2002, Dehejia 2005, Smith and Todd 2005a, 2005b) and a recent symposium in the 
Review of Economics and Statistics (2004, Vol. 86, No. 1, pp. 1-194). 
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unemployed individual participates in the program. For each person we observe the 







Y Y if D
Y Y if D
= =
= =   
where iY  captures post-treatment outcomes of the variable of interest, here specifically 
individual labor market status (“1” when the worker is employed and “0” otherwise). Thus, 
the unit level causal effect given by 1 0i i iY YΔ = −  is never directly observable. The essential 
conceptual point is that nonetheless each individual has two possible outcomes associated 
with herself, where one realization of the outcome variable can actually be observed for 
each individual, and the other one is a counterfactual outcome.  
 Since individual-level effects cannot be observed, the estimand of interest should 
be a measure that summarizes individual gains from treatment appropriately. One 
parameter that has received particular interest in the program evaluation literature is the 
average treatment effect for the treated population (ATET), 
(1) )1|()1|()1|()1|( 0101 =−===−==Δ DYEDYEDYYEDE , 
where the expectations operator E(.) denotes population averages. The parameter is 
generally not identified from observational data: Whereas the first of the population 
averages in the ATET parameter can be identified for the treatment group subsample, the 
counterfactual expectation )1|( 0 =DYE is not identifiable without invoking further 
assumptions, since the outcome under no-treatment is not observed for the treated 
population. This is precisely the counterfactual of interest: What outcome would the 
treated units have realized if they had not been exposed to the treatment? 
 If treatment is not randomly assigned, matching intends to mimic a randomized 
experiment ex post. This strategy is feasible if there is only “overt bias” (Rosenbaum 1995), 
i.e. treatment and comparison group differ prior to treatment only in observable variables 
that matter for the outcome under study. Let X denote the vector of observed pre-
treatment variables, or covariates. Then the concept of “selection on observables” is 
formalized in the following identifying assumption: The assignment mechanism D is 
independent of the potential outcomes Y0 and Y1 conditional on X (Rubin 1974, 1977). 
This assumption is commonly referred to as unconfoundedness (Imbens 2004). By the 
unconfoundedness assumption it is possible to replace the no-treatment outcome for the 
treated population with the no-treatment outcome of the non-treated, i.e. comparison, 




( | , 1) ( | , 1) ( | , 1)
( | , 1) ( | , 0).
E X D E Y X D E Y X D
E Y X D E Y X D
Δ = = = − =
= = − =  
This covariate-adjusted ATET is identified from observable data.  
 
4. Analyzing Matched Samples 
4.1 Composition of Matched Samples 
For each of the two active labor market measures under scrutiny – Training and 
Intervention Works – we analyze treatment effects and illustrate the role of labor force 
status sequences using two samples. As the reservoir from which comparison units are 
drawn, we consider those observations in the PLFS that have at least one spell of 
unemployment over the sampling period January 1992 to August 1996, and whose timing 
structure would potentially allow them to find a matching partner among the treated 
workers. The two matched samples are then defined as follows. 
 
Sample A: A comparison unit is matched to a treated unit, if his or her labor 
market history is observed without substantial gaps for 12 months preceding the 
start of treatment and for 9 months succeeding the end of treatment, and if he or 
she is identical in observable covariates age, gender, education, marital status, and 
region. 
 
Sample B: A comparison unit is matched to a treated unit, if the requirements for 
sample (A) are met, and if he or she displays an identical 4-quarter (12-month) pre-
treatment labor market history at the exact same point in time as the treated unit.12 
 
The matching algorithm used to construct samples (A) and (B) applies exact covariate 
matching. For both samples, if a treated individual finds any matching partner among the 
potential comparisons, this observation is retained. The algorithm allows for an 
oversampling procedure, i.e. a treated unit may be assigned more than one comparison 
unit. This procedure reflects our conviction that timing is the pivotal aspect of comparison 
group construction in a transition economy (see also next subsection). Under requirement 
                                                          
12 We consider 6 age categories, 3 education categories, gender, marital status, and 49 regions, resulting in 
3528 different cells for sample (A). Including a 4-quarter sequence of a trinomial labor market outcome 
variable (cf. section 4.2) increases the number of cells to 3528*34=285,768 cells for sample (B).  
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(B) fewer treated units find matching partners than under (A), and the number of matched 
comparison units is smaller. Thus, algorithm (B) proceeds with replacement: some 
comparison units are matched to more than one treated individual. 
 Section 2 above has detailed that the selection into programs followed certain 
stipulations, which were broadly specified rather than specific. They did, however, clearly 
put the main emphasis on individuals' previous labor market experience and human capital 
acquisition. We thus believe that in the given text the unconfoundedness assumption is 
justified, basing our analysis on a set of core covariates – including education and age, 
which also played a role in selecting participants – in combination with very detailed labor 
force status histories. Moreover, we take into account the importance of local labor market 
conditions (cf. Heckman, Ichimura and Todd 1997) by means of an indicator variable for 
the 49 Polish regions ("voivodships"). 
Table 4 presents sample sizes and covariate means for samples (A) and (B). We 
observe that there is a reduction in the number of treated units who find matching partners 
when moving from the reservoir to sample (B) of approximately one quarter for Training, 
and less than one quarter for Intervention Works. Due to matching-with-replacement, 
samples (B) contain comparison units matched to more than one treated unit. With less 
than one percent, the number is very low for Training, and with approximately one tenth it 
is also fairly low for Intervention Works. Table 4 also shows that Training participants on 
average are better educated, somewhat younger and more likely to be female than 
Intervention Works participants. Clearly, while the reservoir displays imbalances in the 
covariates, matching in samples (A) and (B) by definition produces balance, since it 
conditions on identicalness in observed characteristics age, education, sex, marital status, 
and local labor market (region).  
 
4.2 The timing of interventions 
In sample (B) we require treated and matched comparison units to display an identical pre-
treatment history. To achieve comparability across the two samples (A) and (B), we impose 
the requirement on sample (A) that we observe any history at all in the year preceding 
treatment, although the precise information what history was experienced is not used in 
matching13. Moreover, to allow an assessment of post-treatment labor market performance, 
we require treated units and comparison units in all samples to have a complete post-
                                                          
13 This requirement was also used to define the reservoir. 
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treatment sequence of labor force status in the nine months after treatment. Monthly 
employment information is condensed into a sequence of three quarters of a multinomial 
outcome variable (0,1,2) denoting labor force status (out-of-the-labor force, employed, 
unemployed). The state "employed" overrules the other two states, i.e. if a person is 
employed in at least one month of a quarter, we consider her employed during that quarter. 
For comparison units in sample (B) this procedure implies that they will only be 
matched to a treated unit if, in addition to being identical in the other covariates, they have 
an identical past 4-quarter labor force status history looking back from the point in time – 
the exact month – when the treated unit entered the program. Correspondingly, the 3-
quarter outcome sequence for this matched comparison unit will be evaluated exactly 
congruent with the treated unit's 3-quarter post-treatment outcome sequence, i.e. after the 
treated person leaves the program. This approach accomplishes to define “treatment start” 
and “treatment stop” for comparison units, points in time that otherwise are not defined. 
Moreover, treated and untreated units are always compared during the same period, such 
that changes in general economic conditions, even on the local labor market level, are 
controlled for.14  
Figure 1 illustrates the procedure for sample (A), which disregards the precise 
sequence of labor force states but imposes the timing requirements discussed above. The 
figure also shows how the 12-month-sequence is condensed into the comparable 4-quarter-
structure. This method generates a “moving window” as the algorithm advances through 
the spells of treated units one after the other searching for comparable untreated units at 
the corresponding points in time. Figure 2 demonstrates the increased stringency of the 
matching requirements associated with samples (B), where one or more controls are 
matched to a treated unit on the basis of identical pre-treatment labor force status 
sequences at the same point in time. 
 
4.3 Pre-Treatment Histories 
A central aspect of program evaluation regards the process that determines participation 
and non-participation in the program, and the potential problem of participants self-
selecting into the treatment on the basis of observed or unobserved information. In the 
US, where ALMP measures were first evaluated, interest was mainly in the earnings 
                                                          
14 Such changes did indeed occur in Poland during transition. For instance, overall unemployment displayed 
an inverted U-shape over our sampling period, increasing from 13.3% (1992) via 14.0% (1993) to 14.4% 
(1994), and then falling again to 13.3% (1995) and 12.4% (1996). 
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performance of participants. With respect to the determinants of participation, the focus 
then, logically, was on the differences in pre-treatment earnings performance of program 
participants and non-participants. In the context of controlling for such differences in the 
earnings performance of treatment and comparison groups prior to treatment, Ashenfelter 
(1978) pointed to a potentially serious limitation of difference-in-differences methods when 
he observed a relative decline in pre-treatment earnings for participants in subsidized 
training programs. This empirical regularity has been called “Ashenfelter's dip” and has 
been confirmed by subsequent analyses of many other training and adult education 
programs (cf. Bassi 1983, Ashenfelter and Card 1985, LaLonde 1986, Heckman, LaLonde, 
and Smith 1999). 
For instance, Ashenfelter and Card (1985) apply a model that focuses on earnings 
changes as the determinants of participation. This line of thought was a logical 
consequence of both Ashenfelter's discovery and the main objective of the program, and 
resulted in analyses using earnings histories to eliminate differences between participants 
and non-participants. Clearly, the fact whether the pre-program earnings dip is transitory or 
permanent determines what would have happened to participants had they not 
participated, and the validity of any estimation approach depends on the relationship 
between earnings in the post-program period and the determinants of program 
participation (Heckman and Smith 1999). 
 This rather established observation that it is earnings dynamics that drive program 
participation has lately been put into question by Heckman and Smith (1999), who argue 
that it is rather labor force dynamics that determine participation in an ALMP program, a 
point they reinforce in their recent in-depth analysis of the determinants of program 
participation (Heckman and Smith 2004). This point had been made before by Card and 
Sullivan (1988), albeit implicitly, who analyze training effects conditional on pre-program 
employment histories. Furthermore, Heckman and Smith (1999) argue for a distinction 
between employment dynamics – indicating whether an individual is employed or not – 
and labor force dynamics, incorporating also whether a non-employed person is either 
unemployed or out-of-the-labor-force. Their conclusion is “that labor force dynamics, 
rather than earnings or employment dynamics, drive the participation process” (Heckman 
and Smith 1999). Therefore, we extend the “employment history setting” considered in 
Card and Sullivan (1988) to a “labor force status history setting”, reflecting also movements 
in and out of inactivity. This approach is delineated above in section 4.2. 
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 Figures 3 and 4 draw the distributions of pre-treatment labor market histories for 
samples (A) for both Training (Fig.3) and Intervention Works (Fig.4)15. Representing a 12-
month labor force status sequence with 4 quarterly realizations of a trinomial variable 
(0,1,2) yields 81 possible sequences (“0000” to “2222”). For the purpose of illustrating the 
distributions – and only for that purpose – we classify these 81 sequences into 11 
categories, so that on the abscissa the bottom categories contain “inactive” sequences 
(mostly “0”s), the middle categories comprise “unemployed” sequences (“2”s), and the top 
categories represent “employed” sequences (“1”s). Categories 1, 6, and 11 exclusively 
embody the straight sequences (i.e. “0000”, “2222”, and “1111”, respectively). 
Thus, of the three peaks we observe in the graphs in Figures 3 and 4, the left peak 
represents “inactive” histories, because histories with a low order number contain many 
“0”s. Accordingly, the peak in the middle expresses “unemployed” histories, and the peak 
to the right depicts “employed” histories. In terms of balancing of distributions, the picture 
is almost the same for Figures 3 and 4. For both policy measures samples (A) display only 
limited accordance in pre-treatment histories for treated and comparison units. The figures 
also show that treatment individuals in Training are quite different from those in 
Intervention Works. For the Training participants, the fractions of “employed” and 
“unemployed” histories are quite close to each other, while in the Intervention Works 
sample we observe a far larger fraction of “unemployed” histories among the treated. This 
is entirely in line with the regulations regarding selection for participating in Intervention 
Works (Section 2.2). Moreover, for both Training and Intervention Works the comparison 
samples (A) are too “successful” in that they contain too many “employed” sequences 
relative to “unemployed” sequences in order to be comparable to the treated units, where 
“unemployed” sequences dominate. 
 
4.4 Dynamics of treatment assignment 
Recent work on program evaluation has increasingly considered dynamic aspects inherent 
to estimating treatment effects of active labor market policies. Against the backdrop of 
generally rather disappointing evidence on the effectiveness of training across countries 
(Heckman et al. 1999, Kluve 2006), one recent line of research, for instance, shows that 
positive treatment effects may only materialize in the long run, and that program 
effectiveness can show a considerable dynamic ranging from often severe short-term 
                                                          
15 Clearly, in sample (B) these distributions will be balanced. 
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locking-in effects to long-term gains in employment prospects (e.g. Lechner et al. 2004). 
Other lines of research on program evaluation dynamics discuss e.g. the evaluation of 
program sequences (Lechner and Wiehler 2007) or the treatment effects that arise from 
continuous variation in the program length (Kluve, Schneider, Uhlendorff, Zhao 2007).  
Fredriksson and Johansson (2003) discuss dynamic program evaluation focusing on 
the timing of treatment as an outcome of a stochastic process. In their framework, a set of 
identical individuals enters unemployment at time zero, and then each individual does or 
does not start treatment at some subsequent point in time over the sampling frame. In 
particular, Fredriksson and Johansson (2003) discuss that by defining a comparison group 
as the group of individuals who were never treated (hence disregarding individuals who 
receive treatment later) one implicitly conditions on future outcomes, and they show that 
this can bias estimates towards finding negative treatment effects. Steiger (2005) is an 
application of this framework. 
As explained in the previous sections, our approach models the dynamics of 
treatment assignment in a different way. We include all individuals who are unemployed 
during at least one quarter over the sampling period, which is the minimum requirement to 
be eligible for program participation at all. Then individuals can enter treatment at any 
point in time, and they can be unemployed at any point in time. This procedure creates 
sufficient flexibility for matching treated and comparison units at varying time points (the 
“moving window”), which is crucial to take into account the changes in institutional set-up 
(cf. section 2) and economic context common to a transition economy, which indeed 
actually occur over our sampling period. In addition, individual-level dynamics are captured 
in the pre-treatment labor force status sequences that delineate the idiosyncratic path to 
program entry. 
 
5. Empirical results 
5.1 Distributions of outcomes 
Figures 5 and 6 plot distributions for the post-treatment employment success for treated 
units and comparison units in samples (A) and (B). There are 27 possible labor market 
status sequences capturing employment performance in the three quarters succeeding 
treatment. Similar to our presentation of pre-treatment labor market histories, we classify 
these 27 possible sequences of 3 quarterly realizations of a trinomial variable into 9 
categories for illustration purposes. Once more, bottom categories contain “inactive” 
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sequences (category 1=“000”), middle categories include “unemployed” sequences 
(category 5=“222”), and top categories comprise “employed” histories (category 9=“111”). 
Accordingly, in the graphs the left peak depicts “inactive” sequences, the middle peak 
“unemployed” sequences, and the right peak represents “employed” histories.  
For the Training samples shown in Figure 5 we find, similar to what we have seen 
for the pre-treatment sequences of these samples (Figure 3), the “employed” and 
“unemployed” peaks have more or less the same height also for the post-treatment 
sequence. But while for sample (A) the “employed” peak is higher for comparison units 
than for treated units, and the “unemployed” peak is higher for treated units than for 
comparison units, this relation switches for sample (B). In (B) treated units display on 
average a slightly more successful post-treatment labor market sequence than 
corresponding comparisons. This would be an indication of a slightly – possibly 
insignificant – positive treatment effect of Training. 
Looking at the Intervention Works samples in Figure 6, we find that in both 
samples the “unemployed” sequences are clearly predominant for the treated units. At the 
same time, comparison units display rather successful labor market histories in sample (A). 
In sample (B) this picture changes considerably, and a larger fraction of comparison units 
also displays “unemployed” histories. However, the comparison group still fares visibly 
better than the program participants. Sample (B) therefore indicates that during the 9 
months directly succeeding participation in Intervention Works the treated units seem to 
be on average marginally – possibly insignificantly – less successful in finding employment 
than the comparison units. 
 Taken together, Figures 5 and 6 display three important patterns. First, moving 
from (A) to (B) we do not observe much variation in the distributions for treated units. 
Thus, the fact that we lose some treated units while increasing matching requirements does 
not seem to play an important role. Second, without conditioning on pre-treatment labor 
market histories the comparison samples apparently contain too many “successful” 
individuals – a pattern which we already observed for pre-treatment labor force status 
sequences in Figures 3 and 4. For samples (A) this would probably result in too negative an 
estimate of treatment effects. Third, across comparison units and treated units we observe 
clearly more “successful” outcomes for Training than for Intervention Works. This, too, is 
not surprising, as we noticed a similar relation for pre-treatment labor market history 
distributions (Fig. 3 and 4). 
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5.2 Treatment effect estimation 
For purposes of the formal exposition of our estimation approach we consider a single 
generic intervention. Since we explicitly require that treated units be matched with 
comparison units from the identical set of observed pre-treatment and post-treatment 
months, any reference to the time period can be omitted from the formal exposition. In 
addition to the terminology introduced in section 3, let N1 denote the number of treated 
units, with indices 1i I∈ , and N0 the number of potential comparison units, with indices 
0i I∈ . Potential labor market outcomes in post-treatment quarter q (q = 1, 2, 3) are 
denoted by 1qiY , if individual i received treatment, and by 
0
qiY , if individual i did not receive 
treatment. Outcomes are defined as multinomials with three possible realizations (“0”=out-
of-the-labor-force, “1”=employed, “2”=unemployed), extending the formulations of Card 
and Sullivan (1988) from a binomial to a trinomial setting, i.e. labor force status histories 
instead of employment histories, and considering quarterly rather than yearly sequences. 
We can only observe one of the two potential outcomes 1qiY  and 
0
qiY  for a given 
individual. This actual outcome is denoted by Yqi. The objective is to formally construct an 
estimator of the mean of the unobservable counterfactual outcome E( 0qY |D=1). Since 
following the quarterly sequence of labor market outcomes might be too detailed for a 
direct economic interpretation of results, we condense the available information further 
and summarize the post-intervention labor market success of each individual i by the 
individual’s average employment rate over the three quarters following the intervention16. 
Using an indicator function 1(.), these employment rate outcomes are 
1 ( 1)3i qiqY Y≡ =∑ 1 , and 1iY  and 0iY , respectively, for employment rates with and 
without treatment. Observed outcomes for individual i can then be written as 
(3) 
1 0
(1 ) ,i i i i iY D Y D Y= + −   
and the impact of the intervention on the labor force status of individual i is given by 
(4) 
1 0
i i iY YΔ = − .  
The parameters of interest in our evaluation analysis are weighted population averages over 
these individual treatment effects, the mean effect of treatment on the treated for types of 
                                                          
16 Kluve et al. (1999) consider extensions to multinomial labor market states and longer post-treatment 
horizons. 
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individuals characterized simultaneously by specific sets of characteristics X; and labor 
force status histories before treatment h, 
(5) 
1 0
( , , 1) ( , , 1) .E X h D E Y Y X h DΔ = = − =  
The ultimate interest there typically lies in the average treatment effects over the joint 
support of X and h given D=1, 
(6) )1,|( =Δ=∑ DsEwM s s , 
with s indicating any possible combination of X and h, and ws representing the 
corresponding relative frequency in the treatment sample. In what follows we will also 
consider appropriate subsets of this joint support, and counterfactual treatment 
populations, using different relative weights. 
How does this matching approach identify the parameters of interest? In 
randomized experiments the counterfactual expected values under no intervention can 
simply be estimated for intervention recipients by the mean values of the outcome for 
randomized-out would-be recipients. As detailed in section 3, matching methods can 
recover the desired counterfactual for a nonexperimental comparison group if 
unconfoundedness holds: Within each matched set of individuals, one can estimate the 
treatment impact on individual i by the difference over sample means, and one can 
construct an estimate of the overall impact by forming a weighted average over these 
individual estimates.  
Matching estimators thereby approximate the virtues of randomization mainly by 
balancing the distribution of observed attributes across treatment and comparison groups, 
both by ensuring a common region of support for individuals in the intervention sample 
and their matched comparisons and by re-weighting the distribution over the common 
region of support. The central identification assumption is that of mean independence of 
the labor market status 0iY  and of the treatment indicator Di, given individual observable 
characteristics. In our specific application these conditioning characteristics are the 
demographic and regional variables Xi and the pre-treatment history hi, i.e.  
(7) 0 0( , , 1) ( , , 0) .E Y X h D E Y X h D= = =  
We believe that conditioning on both core socioeconomic characteristics – including, in 
particular, information on local labor markets – and detailed labor force status sequences 
with exact alignment of the pre-treatment period lends plausibility to the 
unconfoundedness assumption, reflecting a meticulous adjustment of the method to the 
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research question and data at hand. Moreover, using the longitudinal structure of the data, 
labor force status sequences likely reflect relevant unobserved but time-persistent 
differences, such as e.g. motivation, between treated and untreated individuals. 
In a standard difference-in-differences approach pre-treatment and post-treatment 
outcomes are typically treated symmetrically and the identifying assumption is that the 
change in outcomes that treated individuals would have experienced had they not received 
treatment would have been the same change – on average – that untreated individuals 
experienced during the same period. Whereas this assumption accounts for the 
phenomenon that participants typically experience lower pre-treatment outcomes, even 
though they might otherwise be identical to comparison units, it does not lend itself 
naturally to the analysis of categorical outcome variables. In this context, a natural 
generalization of the difference-in-differences idea is to condition on the specific 
realization of the outcome variable in the pre-treatment period, as we do in our study. This 
is possible, since due to the categorical nature of the outcome the conditioning remains 
tractable.  
Our matching estimator applies an oversampling exact covariate matching within 
calipers, allowing for matching-with-replacement. Our particular attention to pre-treatment 
labor force status sequences implements this idea of a generalized difference-in-differences 
juxtaposition between treated units and comparison units. Due to the relevance of the 
previous history for subsequent labor market success – state dependence is one of the 
issues most discussed in the labor literature – we also emphasize this variable in the 
construction of the estimates. Specifically, for any treatment group history h for which at 






h h j i
h i j
i I j I X C Xh i
M Y Y
N n∈ ∈ ∧ ∈
⎡ ⎤= −⎢ ⎥⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∑ ∑   
where N1h is the number of individuals with history h who receive the intervention 
( ∑= h hNN 11 ), I1h is the set of indices for these individuals, C(Xi) defines the caliper for 
individual i's characteristics Xi, and ni0 is the number of comparisons with history h who are 
falling within this caliper, with the set of indices for comparison units with history h being 
I0h. The estimated standard error of the treatment effect estimate is then constructed as a 
function of the underlying estimated probabilities. The overall effect of the intervention is 
estimated in a last step by calculating a weighted average over the history-specific 
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intervention effects, 
(9) ˆ ˆ .h hhM w M= ∑        
using the treated units' sample fractions 1 1h hhN N∑ as weights. One can easily employ 
alternative weights – for instance the treated units’ sample fractions observed for another 
intervention. This will allow to contrast the performance of alternative measures holding 
the composition of the treatment population constant. 
 
5.3 Treatment effect results 
Table 5 presents average treatment effects on the post-intervention employment rate for 
Training. The treatment effect estimate for sample (A) is insignificant, while the estimate 
obtained from sample (B) indicates that participation in Training results in an employment 
rate that is on average nearly 14 percentage points higher than it would have been in the 
absence of the program. Looking more closely at a classification by labor market history, 
we find the “peaks” from Figure 3, indicating that the share of “1111” sequences is almost 
as large as the share of “2222” sequences. Subsample sizes here are too small to draw any 
firm conclusions. Yet, it becomes transparent that the imbalance in unobservables that a 
matching algorithm would have produced, had it not accounted for labor market histories, 
would have emphasized the relatively “successful” nature of comparisons. Thus, it would 
have given the program less credit for the employment success of participants than would 
have been appropriate. 
 Stratifying the sample by time of entry into training allows us to make the point 
that the difference in the employment rates of the treated and the controls is unlikely 
driven by benefit regulations. Those who entered training before January 1st, 1995 were 
entitled to a full round of benefits if they could not find a regular job after the intervention, 
while this generous provision was cancelled for training participants entering after this date. 
The treatment effect is, however, larger - and statistically significant – for the subsample of 
entrants of the earlier period. 
 To illustrate the performance of the algorithm, we also report two "raw effects" 
resulting from simpler matching variants. The first one reports the effect we would 
estimate on a sample only using the timing structure, i.e. the moving window, but no 
information on covariates and labor force status sequences. The second one reports the 
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effect obtained from a simple covariate matching, without use of the moving window.17 
The results for training show that both of these effects are similar to the one obtained from 
Sample (A) (and all are insignificant), and that including the labor force status histories 
makes the difference in revealing the effectiveness of the training scheme. 
Table 6 reports the treatment effect estimates for Intervention Works. It is to be 
expected that, on the basis of sample (A), estimates are more negative than the estimate 
derived from sample (B). After all, the relatively favorable composition of the comparison 
group with respect to unobservables is reflected in the pre-treatment labor market histories 
documented in Figure 4. Classification by labor market history allows us to look at the two 
major labor force status sequences that drive the peaks observed in Figure 4. For 
“employed” (1111) histories subsample sizes are rather small and the effects not well 
defined. For the subsample of “unemployed” (2222) histories, which entails almost 80% of 
total treated and comparison units, we find a significantly negative treatment effect close to 
the full sample effect. This is certainly no surprise, as the estimate of the full sample effect 
is dominated by the “2222” subsample effect. The "raw effects" reported in Table 6 
illustrate the importance of including the moving window structure, but above all they 
show again how crucial it is to control for individual labor force status histories. 
In finding reasons for the negative treatment effects of Intervention Works, it is 
sometimes suggested that subsidized jobs are of lower quality, locking the participating 
workers in a dead end, rather than preparing them for future labor market success. It might 
also be a stigmatization effect that causes participants of an employment program like 
Intervention Works to perform worse in the labor market than non-participants. 
Prospective employers might identify participants as “low productivity workers” and are 
not willing to accept them into regular jobs. Another explanation, which might have 
particular merit in the Polish case, is “benefit churning”: Workers with long unemployment 
spells who have difficulty finding regular employment might be identified by labor bureau 
officials and only be chosen for participation in the Intervention Works scheme so that 
they re-qualify for another round of benefit payment. It is perhaps not a mere coincidence 
that the large majority of Intervention Works jobs in our sample lasts six months, exactly 
the length of time one needs to work within the year preceding benefit receipt in order to 
                                                          
17 The number of untreated observations used in estimating this second raw effect is smaller than the one 
used for the first raw effect due to restrictions necessary for calculating the respective effects. In particular, 
since no flexible timing structure is imposed for the second raw effect, the average employment rates during 
the last nine months of the sampling period are used to calculate the effect. Because for the first raw effect 
this is flexible over the sampling period and need not be the last nine months, more observations can be used.  
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qualify for unemployment benefits. This is illustrated by the average program duration of 
6.1 months (Table 4) – in fact, more than 57% of participants stayed in Intervention Works 
for exactly six months, and about 79% for six months or longer. 
If selection into Intervention Works would indeed depend on the outcome (i.e. 
becoming unemployed again and receiving benefits after the program ends) in this manner, 
it might be problematic to maintain the unconfoundedness assumption. To address this 
aspect, however, we include an additional covariate indicating whether the individual 
received benefits in the last month before entering the program. This indicator – especially 
in conjunction with the labor force status history – captures the dynamic of running out of 
benefits (while remaining unemployed) before program start, and thus controls for benefit 
exhaustion being a potential selection criterion.  
The corresponding results shown at the bottom of Table 6 are similar to the ones 
obtained without the benefit indicator and continue to point to a generally negative effect 
of Intervention Works. For Sample (A) the estimated treatment effect is less negative than 
without the indicator, which likely reflects the fact that the indicator already captures some 
aspect of the labor market history. The estimate based on Sample (B) is very close to the 
one without the benefit receipt indicator (a decrease in the employment probability of 12.6 
and 14.7 percentage points, respectively), though the number of matched treated units is 
reduced quite a bit. 
 In addition to the effects of a program per se, i.e. relative to a no-program state, it is 
often of interest for policy makers to compare programs, i.e. to learn about how effective 
one particular program is relative to some other program. This issue has been addressed by 
the literature on "multiple treatments", which extends the Potential Outcome Model to 
settings in which treatment can take on more than two values (cf. Imbens 2000, Lechner 
2001 and 2002 for discussion). This extends the set of relevant counterfactuals, in 
particular assessing the question "What would have happened to person i, who participated 
in program A, had she instead participated in program B?". 
 In the spirit of this literature, Table 7 presents treatment effect estimates for 
samples (B) obtained from a simple “counterfactual experiment”. The first line reports the 
factual Training treatment effect estimate computed as shown in Table 5. This estimate 
tries to answer the question: “How much did Training participants benefit from 
participating in Training?” The second line reports a “counterfactual” Intervention Works 
treatment effect for Training participants, i.e. it tries to answer the question: “How much 
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would Training participants have benefited, if they had instead participated in Intervention 
Works?” The estimate is obtained by history-wise reweighting the Intervention Works 
sample using the fraction of the treated units in the Training sample as weights. Clearly, 
this reweighting by labor market history implicitly assumes that there are no relevant 
changes in other elements of X, and emphasizes that the labor force status histories are the 
crucial characteristic determining program effectiveness. As Table 4 has shown, Training 
and Intervention Works participants are relatively similar in core covariates, with the 
exception of education. The main difference between the two program groups are in the 
distribution of the labor force status sequences (recall Figures 3 and 4). Hence, in the 
context of our analysis focusing on the importance of these sequences, we are interested in 
relative program effects that arise from counterfactual distribution of labor force histories. 
 The estimate in the second row of Table 7 shows that, while the Intervention 
Works effect on Training participants still displays a negative sign, the effect is 
insignificant, so that Training participants participating in Intervention Works would have 
done better than Intervention Works participants themselves. Looking at the effects of 
Training and Intervention Works, respectively, on Intervention Works participants, we find 
the counterpart to this result: Intervention Works participants participating in Training 
instead would not have gained as much from the treatment as Training participants 
themselves. Thus, persons with better observable and unobservable characteristics seem to 
have been targeted for the Training program. 
 The last two lines in Table 7 report differential treatment effects of Intervention 
Works vs. Training. The estimates represent the difference between the difference of 
treated and comparison units in Intervention Works and the difference of treated and 
comparison units in Training. Once more, differences are taken history-wise and weighted 
using either Intervention Works participants or Training participants sample weights. Both 
estimates clearly show that Training is the superior ALMP relative to Intervention Works.  
 The methodology used in our paper allows us to evaluate ALMP at the individual 
level. It tells us that those persons participating in Polish Training programs have better 
employment prospects than they would have had had they not participated and also that 
they have better employment prospects than those who take part in Intervention Works. 
The methodology does not address the issue whether Training improves the overall 
performance of the labor market, i.e., for example, whether it lowers the aggregate 
unemployment rate. Even if Training is beneficial at the individual level, substitution 
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effects – Training participants just “jump the queue” of those in line for regular jobs – 
could neutralize its impact at the aggregate level. On the other hand, the finding that a 
program is not even effective at the individual level, like the Polish Intervention Works 
scheme, helps us to focus attention on targeting issues and/or wrong incentive structures 
that distort the behavior of labor bureau officials and of the unemployed. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Over the last decade, there has been much interest by labor economists and 
econometricians – from both practical and theoretical perspectives – in the evaluation of 
treatments, in particular labor market interventions such as training and wage subsidy 
schemes. Building on a rather established culture of implementing and evaluating such 
Active Labor Market Policies in the US, Western European countries have caught up 
substantially in this regard. The next to follow are countries of Eastern Europe, often called 
“transition countries”, that in the early years of transition in many cases implemented 
unemployment benefit schemes and active labor market programs similar to Western 
welfare systems. In the case of Poland, even though programs had to be built from scratch, 
already in the year 1996 data were collected that allow comprehensive evaluation of the 
country's ALMP measures during the first half of the 1990s. 
 In this study, we present an evaluation of two Polish active labor policies, Training 
and Intervention Works, i.e. a wage subsidy scheme. There is a set of features that we think 
make this study especially interesting. First, we use data from the 18th wave of the Polish 
Labor Force Survey that contain extensive and detailed information on individual labor 
force status histories from January 1992 until August 1996. Second, the evaluation is set 
against the background of a country in the early years of transition, a fact that implies a 
rapidly changing macroeconomic environment, making it indispensable to develop a 
treatment effect estimator that can account for these changes appropriately. Third, in 
addition to estimating treatment effects on the basis of individual labor force status 
sequences, we use the detailed monthly data to investigate further how important such 
labor market histories are in fact for determining participation in the program.  
 The core part of the analysis is the development of a matching estimator based on 
individual pre-treatment labor force status sequences. This creates a “moving window” 
structure that allows for individually flexible entry into and exit out of the program, hence 
conditioning on covariates and labor force status histories at exactly the month of program 
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start, and comparing outcomes at exactly the month of program termination. Clearly, while 
increasing comparability of treated and comparison units, this procedure also nicely 
controls for changes in the macroeconomic environment. Like in many transition 
countries, we are confronted in the Polish case with a rapidly changing environment of 
labor market institutions and regulations. Using a “moving window” structure is, therefore, 
also vital in ensuring that the estimated treatment effects are not driven by benefit 
regulations or labor market institutions affecting the treated and the control units in a 
different fashion. 
Our approach is delineated using two matched samples (A) and (B) that differ in 
matching requirements. In terms of treatment effect estimates we find a positive effect of 
training on the treated population, and a negative effect of Intervention Works. Our results 
on training add to an increasing number of evaluation studies across European countries, 
including some accession countries, that identify training programs as one Active Labor 
Market Policy that can be effective.18 The evidence on wage subsidy schemes is mixed, 
ranging from often very successful programs (e.g. in Germany and Switzerland) to 
sometimes less promising results, as is also the case here. At any rate, we feel that our 
results on Intervention Works is specific to the Polish case, as characterized by a particular 
incentive structure, including e.g. the possibility of a cycling behavior to renew benefits.  
Most importantly for our paper, we document that pre-treatment labor force status 
sequences contain indispensable information regarding selection into treatment and that 
controlling for these histories can eliminate a large part of the overt bias between treated 
and comparison units. This result confirms and reinforces the point made by Heckman and 
Smith (1999, 2004) in a completely different labor market. 
 
                                                          
18 See Kluve (2006) for an assessment of training measures in Western European countries; studies 
demonstrating the efficacy of training measures in accession countries are, e.g., Kotzeva (2000) for 
Bulgaria, Lubyova and van Ours (1999) for Slovakia, and Leetma and Võrk (2004) for Estonia. 
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Table 2. Expenditures on Training and Intervention Works 
 
Year Training Intervention works 
mln zł percent* mln zł percent* 
1990 1.6 1.3 20.9 17.6 
1991 9.0 9.5 45.3 47.8 
1992 19.3 18.0 46.9 43.6 
1993 45.0 12.6 136.6 38.3 
1994 59.5 10.5 231.7 40.7 
1995 63.1 8.4 311.1 41.2 
1996 86.1 10.7 277.2 34.4 
 
* Percent of total expenditures on active measures. Source: Kubiak (2005). 
 
 
Table 3. Number of  participants in all measures and in training and 
intervention works 1992-1996* 
 
Participants in  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
All measures in thousands 218.1 295.7 412 437.2 367.3 
% of unemployed 8.7 10.2 14.5 16.6 15.6 
Training in thousands 70.2 75.8 91.7 84.1 86 
% of unemployed 2.8 2.6 3.2 3.2 3.7 
Intervention Works 104.5 132.4 195.4 206.3 139.6 
% of unemployed 4.2 4.6 6.9 7.8 5.9 
 
* End-of-year stocks. Source: Own calculations based on data from Ministry of Labor and Social Policy and 
Central Statistical Office (GUS).
Year Expenditures of LF Expenditures on active 
measures  
mln zł % of GDP mln zł % LF 
1990 370.2 0.70 118.7 32.1 
1991 1358.4 1.80 94.7 7.0 
1992 2282.7 2.15 107.5 4.7 
1993 3190.3 2.31 354.5 11.1 
1994 4447.1 2.46 569.0 12.8 
1995 6328.3 2.55 754.9 11.9 
1996 7525.3 2.41 806.1 10.7 
mean  2.05  12.9 
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Table 4. Composition of matched samples 
  Training Intervention Works 
Reservoir age 34.5 36.3 
 %educateda 91.7 64.0 
 %female 56.2 40.4 
 %married 66.9 67.6 
    
 # treated 121 275 
 # untreated 6751 6757 
 
Avg. program duration  
for treated  2.51 6.11 
    
Sample (A) # treated 114 244 
 # untreated 983 1354 
Sample (B) # treated 87 212 
 # untreated 111 240 
 [# untreated]b 110 211 
 
a Excluding individuals with only primary school attainment or less. 












Sample (A) 114 983 -.048 .049 
Sample (B) 87 111 .138 .059 
Sample (B) stratified by labor force 
status history: 
    
"1111" 24 34 .071 .115 
"2222" 32 43 -.077 .103 
Sample (B) stratified by program entry 
date 
    
Before Jan 1, 1995 55 73 .152 .078 
After Jan 1, 1995 32 38 .122 .110 
     
Raw effect (i): No covariates 121 6751 -.027 .046 
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Sample (A) 244 1354 -.291 .031 
Sample (B) 212 240 -.126 .040 
Sample (B) stratified by labor force 
status history: 
    
"1111" 16 19 .084 .148 
"2222" 168 191 -.150 .045 
     
Raw effect (i): No covariates 275 6757 -.285 .026 
Raw effect (ii): No moving window 275 6322 -.312 .030 
     
Additional covariate: benefit receipt     
Sample (A) 242 1152 -.208 .033 
Sample (B) 149 243 -.147 .037 
 
 
Table 7. Counterfactual treatment effects 
Treatment Weights Effect Std.Error Interpretation 
Training Training .138 .059 Factual Training treatment effect
Intervention Works Training -.048 .064 Counterfactual Intervention 
Works treatment effect 
Intervention Works Intervention Works -.126 .040 Factual Intervention 
Works treatment effect 




Intervention Works -.218 .093 Differential treatment effect 
Intervention Works vs. Training
Training – Inter-
vention Works 
Training .185 .087 Differential treatment effect 
Training vs. Intervention Works
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The 34 possible labor force status sequences are classified into 11 categories: “1”=0000; “2”=0001, 0010, 
0100, 1000, 0002, 0020, 0200, 2000; “3”=0012, 0102, 1002, 0120, 1020, 0021, 1200, 0201, 0210, 2100, 2010, 
2001, 0110, 1010, 1100;“4”=0022, 0202, 2002, 0220, 2020, 2200; “5”=2201, 2021, 0221, 2210, 2012, 0212, 
2120, 2102, 0122, 1220, 1202, 1022; “6”=2222; “7”=2220, 2202, 2022, 0222, 2221, 2212, 2122, 1222; 
“8”=2211, 2121, 1221, 2112, 1212, 1122; “9”=1102, 1012, 0112, 1120, 1021, 0121, 1210, 1201, 0211, 2110, 
2101, 2011, 0011, 0101, 1001; “10”=1110, 1101, 1011, 0111, 1112, 1121, 1211, 2111; “11”=1111.  
 
 

















The 34 possible labor force status sequences are classified into 11 categories: “1”=0000; “2”=0001, 0010, 
0100, 1000, 0002, 0020, 0200, 2000; “3”=0012, 0102, 1002, 0120, 1020, 0021, 1200, 0201, 0210, 2100, 2010, 
2001, 0110, 1010, 1100;“4”=0022, 0202, 2002, 0220, 2020, 2200; “5”=2201, 2021, 0221, 2210, 2012, 0212, 
2120, 2102, 0122, 1220, 1202, 1022; “6”=2222; “7”=2220, 2202, 2022, 0222, 2221, 2212, 2122, 1222; 
“8”=2211, 2121, 1221, 2112, 1212, 1122; “9”=1102, 1012, 0112, 1120, 1021, 0121, 1210, 1201, 0211, 2110, 
2101, 2011, 0011, 0101, 1001; “10”=1110, 1101, 1011, 0111, 1112, 1121, 1211, 2111; “11”=1111.  
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The 33 possible labor force status sequences are classified into 9 categories: “1”=000; “2”=001, 010, 100, 002, 
020, 200; “3”=210, 120, 102; “4”=220, 202, 022; “5”=222; “6”=221, 212, 122; “7”=012, 021, 201; “8”=110, 
101, 011, 112, 121, 211; “9”=111. 
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The 33 possible labor force status sequences are classified into 9 categories: “1”=000; “2”=001, 010, 100, 002, 
020, 200; “3”=210, 120, 102; “4”=220, 202, 022; “5”=222; “6”=221, 212, 122; “7”=012, 021, 201; “8”=110, 
101, 011, 112, 121, 211; “9”=111. 
 
